Traditionally, security research has focused primarily on preventing attacks from being successful; however, in many scenarios, thwarting all possible attacks is either practically impossible or financially unrealizable. In these scenarios, defenders have to mitigate the impact of successful attacks by designing the targeted systems and networks so that they sustain minimal losses in case of a successful attack, that is, by designing them to be attack-resilient. Even though attack-resilience resembles random-fault tolerant design in many respects, it is actually fundamentally different due to the strategic nature of the attackers, who may anticipate defensive countermeasures. This strategic nature of the conflict between defenders and attackers is captured most naturally using the game-theory nomenclature, which allows us to establish provable resilience proper ties. In this talk, I show how this approach can be applied to problems from various levels of system architecture, ranging from physical node placement to protecting users from social-engineering attacks. First, I discuss resilient sensor node placement for monitoring cyber-physical systems, and show how to find resilient placements in practice. Second, I consider the problem of providing integrity assurance for communication between resource-bounded devices, and introduce a stochastic message authentication scheme for solving this problem. Third, I discuss mitigation strategies against covert compromises of computer systems, and present results on the optimal schedule of mitigation moves. Fourth, I consider the problem of filtering malicious e-mail, such as spam and spear-phishing e-mail, and show how to find optimal filtering thresholds that take the heterogeneity of users into account. Finally, I give an overview of open research problems and outline directions for future work.

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