Y. Luo and L. Bölöni

Collaborative and competitive scenarios in spatio-temporal negotiation with agents of bounded rationality


Cite as:

Y. Luo and L. Bölöni. Collaborative and competitive scenarios in spatio-temporal negotiation with agents of bounded rationality. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiations, in conjunction with the The Seventh Intl. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 08), pp. 40–47, 2008.

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Abstract:

In spatio-temporal negotiation evaluating an offer for feasibility or utility often requires computationally expensive path planning, thus practical negotiation strategies can evaluate only a small subset of the possible offers during offer formation. As equilibrium strategies are not practically possible, we are interested in strategies with bounded rationality, which achieve good performance in a wide range of practical negotiation scenarios. Naturally, the performance of a strategy is dependent on the strategy of the opponent and the characteristics of the scenario. The utility of a deal alone for a particular agent is not a good measure of the quality of the negotiation strategy; we also need to consider whether better deals were overlooked or whether the agent had ``outsmarted'' the opponent, by convincing it to accept a lesser deal. We also have an intuition of collaborative scenarios (where the agents' interests are closely aligned) versus competitive scenarios (where the gain of the utility for one agent is paid off with a loss of utility for the other agent). Using the Children in the Rectangular Forest (CRF) game as a canonical model of spatio-temporal negotiation, we develop a series of quantitative metrics for the characterization of deals in relation to the possibilities of the scenario and the interest of the other agent. We also develop a metric for the collaborativeness of the scenario. Through an experimental study involving three negotiation strategies of increasing complexity, we show that the proposed metrics match our intuition about the scenarios and can serve as a tool in analyzing and developing strategies as well as in designing negotiation mechanisms promoting cooperative behavior.

BibTeX:

@inproceedings{Luo-2008-ACAN,
    author = "Y. Luo and L. B{\"o}l{\"o}ni",
    title = "Collaborative and competitive scenarios in spatio-temporal negotiation with agents of bounded rationality",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Agent-based
       Complex Automated Negotiations, in conjunction
       with the The Seventh Intl. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and
       Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 08)",
    year = "2008",
    pages = "40-47",
    abstract = {
      In spatio-temporal negotiation evaluating an offer for feasibility
      or utility often requires computationally expensive path planning,
      thus practical negotiation strategies can evaluate only a small
      subset of the possible offers during offer formation. As
      equilibrium strategies are not practically possible, we are
      interested in strategies with bounded rationality, which achieve
      good performance in a wide range of practical negotiation
      scenarios. Naturally, the performance of a strategy is dependent
      on the strategy of the opponent and the characteristics of the
      scenario. The utility of a deal alone for a particular agent is
      not a good measure of the quality of the negotiation strategy; we
      also need to consider whether better deals were overlooked or
      whether the agent had ``outsmarted'' the opponent, by convincing
      it to accept a lesser deal. We also have an intuition of
      collaborative scenarios (where the agents' interests are closely
      aligned) versus competitive scenarios (where the gain of the
      utility for one agent is paid off with a loss of utility for the
      other agent).
      Using the Children in the Rectangular Forest (CRF) game as a
      canonical model of spatio-temporal negotiation, we develop a
      series of quantitative metrics for the characterization of deals
      in relation to the possibilities of the scenario and the interest
      of the other agent. We also develop a metric for the
      collaborativeness of the scenario. Through an experimental study
      involving three negotiation strategies of increasing complexity,
      we show that the proposed metrics match our intuition about the
      scenarios and can serve as a tool in analyzing and developing
      strategies as well as in designing negotiation mechanisms
      promoting cooperative behavior.
    }
}

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