What would you submit to MoVid '13?

Landon Cox **Duke University**

Want to share sensitive data.

Devices have sensors and talk to the cloud.

Data is often sensitive (e.g., location, images).

Mobile sensing services

Tremendous opportunities

- Citizen journalism (CNN's iReport, Al Jazeera Sharek)
- Mobile social services (Foursquare, Micro-Blog)
- Many kinds of monitoring (traffic, parking, prices)


Authenticity is crucial for correctness

- Garbage in garbage out
- Hard to cover many events (Iran, Egypt, Libya, etc.)
- User-generated content is increasingly important
- Injection of false data can have dire consequences













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Images of Gaddafi's death highlight visual distrust in the digital age

By Philip Kennicott, Published: October 20

http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2011/04/citizen-journalism.html

http://ireport.cnn.com

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/The-Vote/2009/0914/that-photo-of-the-912-march-on-washington-its-fake

http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/sickening-tsunami-of-faked-photos-20110315-1bvuo.html

 $http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/images-of-gaddafis-death-highlight-visual-distrust-in-the-digital-age/2011/10/20/gIQArJNm1L_story.html$

Existing approaches

Rely on reputations


- Users often require anonymity
- Users only contribute at most critical moments
- Reputations may be vulnerable to Sybil attacks

Rely on voting, statistical analysis

- Sybil attacks can also skew votes
- May be only a few observers
- How to vote among rich data like images?


Root of trust: secure hardware

- Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
 - Includes private key, can compute hashes, sign statements
- Pertinent functionality
 - Trustworthy attestation of trusted computing base (i.e., the firmware)



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
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Could sign raw sensor data

- Allows services to verify authenticity of raw data
 - Service must trust TPM and device firmware
 - Verify hash in signed statement matches hash of received image

Problem: data cannot be modified




Modifying data locally

- Mobile clients need to control data fidelity
 - Efficient resource usage (energy, bandwidth)
 - Privacy (cropping, blurring faces)
- Any legitimate modification alters data hash
 - Statement about raw data no longer useful










"You're welcome to upload any image that is **3MB or smaller**."



Need resolve tension between authenticity and fidelity



Conclusions

- Key challenge
 - Need to balance authenticity and fidelity
- How do you generate these "heat maps" for video?
 - Analysis is very computationally intensive
 - Can this be done in a timely manner?
 - Can this be done without killing a device's battery?
 - How do you keep the trusted computing base small?
- Lots of hard problems, that we don't know how to answer
 - Email me if you know how! (Landon Cox: lpcox@cs.duke.edu)